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ABSTRACT 
Despite policy commitments and legislated mechanisms, the system of participatory democracy 
in post-1994 South Africa is largely considered to have failed. In order to understand how 
underlying ideas can help to explain weaknesses in practice, this article examines how 
participatory democracy is understood by the ruling African National Congress (ANC). It shows 
that the multiple intellectual traditions shaping the participatory model have led to a set of policy 
initiatives that are not without internal tension. In part, the technocratic creep associated with 
improving public sector performance has stymied participatory efforts by placing efficiency and 
delivery over democracy and empowerment. Alongside this, however, the ANC’s own 
conception of ‘democracy’ remains interwoven with its mass movement history – linking the role 
of popular participation to the extension of its own hegemony. The intent of policy to deepen 
democracy through structures of participatory governance is thus undermined by a teleological 
framing of participation as an intra-movement activity.  
                                                            
*  This article draws on research undertaken for my doctoral thesis at the University of the Witwatersrand, 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) government has reiterated the value of 
citizen participation alongside representative democracy. Local government, in particular, has 
been the focus of this initiative, with a system of participatory democracy being provided for 
through both constitutional provision and municipal legislation. Yet despite the intent to engage 
citizens in decision-making processes about issues that affect their lives, participatory 
democracy in South Africa is largely considered to have failed and has not fulfilled the 
objectives set out for itself in legislation. In conjunction, South Africans have increasingly 
resorted to ‘invented spaces’, such as demonstrations and protest, to make their voices heard.1 
The proliferation of extra-institutional protest - exhibited most recently in the #feesmustfall 
campaign of 2015-162 - has been seen as symptomatic not only of a popular desire to influence 
policy but of the failure of formal, institutional channels for citizen participation in governance 
processes (Benit-Gbaffou 2007, 2008).  
This article examines the ANC’s conception of ‘participatory democracy’ in order to 
understand how weaknesses in practice might be explained by the ideas that inform it. 
Although valuable scholarly attention has been given to both procedural and substantive 
weaknesses in participatory mechanisms, there has been limited examination of their 
conceptual underpinnings as an explanatory factor. There has also been no analysis which takes 
into account the interconnection between the ANC’s very understanding of ‘democracy’ and 
its own mass movement history. An important, yet under-theorised, strand in participatory 
discourse is linked to very identity of the ruling party. 
Drawing on policy, legislation and guidance, as well as discussion documents, publications and 
statements of the ANC, this article examines the conceptual roots of participatory democracy 
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in post-1994 South Africa. It begins by providing an outline of existing legislation and 
implementation. It then goes on to explore the theories and influences underpinning public 
policy and the participatory discourse of the ANC itself, linking them where relevant to 
examples of weakness in practice. In examining the underlying ideas, some conceptual 
parallels and tensions are drawn. The article identifies that a multiplicity of ideas has shaped 
participatory democratic policy and that conceptual tension between these currents has played 
an inhibiting role in its success. However, it also argues that the conceptual construction and 
realisation of participatory democracy remain entangled in the ANC’s organisational history. 
As such, its effectiveness in practice is also constrained by a participatory discourse rooted in 
the historic hegemony of the mass movement and its identity as a popular vanguard.  
POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
One of the earliest expressions of the ANC’s participatory ethos as a governing party can be 
found in the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (ANC 1994a). Drawing 
on ideas of ‘people-driven’ development, in which citizens are not merely recipients but key 
actors and agents, the RDP emphasised that ‘Development is not about the delivery of goods 
to a passive citizenry. It is about active involvement and growing empowerment’ (ibid.: 5). It 
also embraced a reading of democracy which encompassed not only periodic elections, but ‘a 
wide range of institutions of participatory democracy in partnership with civil society’ (ibid.: 
120-1).  
Local government, in particular, was viewed as the key arena for its realisation (ibid.: 129). 
Having been produced as an ANC policy framework, the RDP eventually came to inform the 
1998 White Paper on Local Government (Everatt et al. 2010: 224), the central concept of which 
was ‘developmental local government’, emphasizing ‘the involvement of citizens and 
community groups in the design and delivery of municipal programmes’ (RSA 1998a). The 
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Municipal Structures Act (RSA 1998b) and Municipal Systems Act (RSA 2000) introduced 
the mechanisms for participation. The former called for the establishment of ‘ward committees’ 
as elected forums for communities to ‘raise issues of concern’ with their ward councillor and 
‘to have a say in [municipal] decisions, planning and projects’ (DPLG, GTZ & ASALGP 2005: 
5). The Municipal Systems Act then introduced a requirement on municipalities to produce an 
Integrated Development Plan (IDP), providing the opportunity for citizens to shape municipal 
planning and budgeting through a prioritization of needs in their area. Other sector-specific 
structures have also been established. The Community Policing Forum (CPF), while not a 
structure of municipal government, functions at the community level, aiming to improve 
accountable policing and involve citizens in reducing and preventing crime (RSA 1995). 
Although the ward committee system is explicitly seen as providing a participatory democratic 
function (RSA 1998b; DPLG 2005: 7), existing research has revealed substantial failings in 
practice, including the inadequate powers delegated to ward committees, insufficient 
community education, limited representivity, political party dominance and interference, lack 
of accountability to communities, and unresponsive ward councillors and municipalities 
(Benit-Gbaffou 2008; Buccus et al 2008; Piper & Deacon 2009; Malabela & Ally 2011, Kabane 
undated).3 Although participation in the IDP process varies across municipalities, survey data 
has shown low community awareness of the IDP’s existence but a direct correlation between 
awareness and participation (Everatt et al 2010: 234-5).4 Examination of the quality of this 
participation, however, has led the IDP to be regarded as lip service to any real community 
influence: the ‘canvasing’ of public views carries no guarantee of them being addressed (ibid.: 
238).  
While greater resources, improved training, civic education and enhanced institutional capacity 
are all issues to be addressed, the conceptual underpinnings of the government’s project – and, 
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by implication, the ideas that shape practice - may also go some way to explaining the limits 
to its success. 
CURRENTS OF PARTICIPATION IN POLICY DISCOURSE 
Participatory traditions and radical democracy 
The post-1994 commitment to participatory democracy emerges in part from the traditions of 
community organisation which flourished in South Africa during the ANC’s years in exile. The 
decade of the 1980s, in particular, gave birth to the phenomenon of ‘people’s power’. Advanced 
by the civic movement and the ANC-aligned United Democratic Front (UDF), the term 
‘people’s power’ was used to characterize the 1980s era of mass activity and anti-state action 
that took place under the banner of the ANC. More specifically, it was used to refer to the 
formation of popular structures (or ‘organs of people’s power’ in ANC-UDF lexicon) which 
provided functions ranging from welfare services and advice, to de facto community self-
government. For many UDF and civic activists of the time, people’s power presupposed a 
participatory democratic future.  
After 1994, these historic expectations of community participation penetrated local 
government discussion. Many of those who participated in developing and implementing new 
local government policy had roots in the UDF, civic, trade union and student movements. 
Several post-1994 ANC government ministers with a background in the trade unions and civics 
referred to contemporary structures of participation such as ward committees and CPFs as 
being akin or having links to the tradition of organs of people’s power (Mashatile 2013 int.; 
Carrim 2013 int.; and Tsenoli 2013 int.). 5 
Ideas about participation also echoed an historic belief in the ANC camp in the inadequacy of 
representative democracy alone. Andrew Boraine, a UDF member involved in the development 
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of policy on local government from 1990 remarked that ideas about civic participation were 
influenced by the whole notion of needing ‘to go beyond the formal five-year cycle of 
elections’ (2013 int.). The ANC’s RDP also asserted its own foundations in the principle of 
participatory democracy: ‘- that people who are affected by decisions must take part in making 
those decisions’ (ANC 1994b). 
Part of the people’s power discourse was the notion of its empowering potential. Emerging 
predominantly from civic and community activists and Left student movements, this narrative 
drew on the idea of people taking control of their own lives (Cherry 2000: 26; Boraine 1987: 
8) and on the transformative and developmental role of democracy. Here, the organs of 
people’s power established by those at home constituted grassroots structures of decision-
making. Their mode of organisation also reflected traits of the independent trade unions (of 
which some civic leaders were also members). Several individuals involved in producing the 
ANC’s RDP had backgrounds in the civic and trade union movements and the imprint of their 
democratic traditions can be seen in document itself (Stewart 1997: 5).  
This radical tradition has remained partly visible in contemporary policy in which participatory 
governance continues to be understood as a necessary supplement to representative democracy. 
The South African Local Government Association’s 2006 handbook for municipal councillors, 
asserts: 
Democracy in South Africa is about more than just voting. It is about people having the right to be 
informed about what their government is doing, and having the right to participate in decision-making, 
especially when the decisions directly affect them. This helps create empowered citizens who have the 
initiative to continue to contribute to the development of their communities (SALGA & GTZ 2006: 45).  
The 2005 Draft National Policy Framework for Public Participation also highlights the issue 
of empowerment by describing the deepening of democracy (DPLG 2005: 1) as involving a 
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move toward ‘a partnership approach’ in which ‘citizens represented by ward committees … 
[have] recognised powers, with delegated responsibilities’ (ibid.: 6).  
Participatory development 
Also inspiring thinking about local government was the idea of ‘participatory development’ 
(McGee 2002). From the 1980s onwards, a wave of thinking emerged in development discourse 
that located popular participation not only within discrete ‘projects’ but in the development 
process as a whole (ibid.: 94-5). Such ideas were associated with Brazilian scholar, Paulo Freire 
(ibid.: 94). His writings about the pedagogy of democracy and development, and the idea of 
people as active agents (Infed undated) were influential on community activists in South Africa 
(Tsenoli 2013 int.; Coleman 2013 int.; and Cherry 2012 int.). This ethos also fitted nicely with 
the intellectual heritage and practical experience of the UDF and civics. The Mass Democratic 
Movement (MDM) - a term that came into being in 1988 to refer to the loose collection of 
groups aligned to the ANC, including the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 
and the UDF - argued that: ‘- communities should have direct control over the process of 
development’ (MDM 1990).  
With the commencement of local government negotiations after 1990, ideas about bottom-up 
development transferred. The progressive non-governmental sector in South Africa, involved 
in issues surrounding urban citizenship and planning, were also strongly influenced by ideas 
of community participation in development. Several of these organisations were involved in 
early policy formulation in the 1990s, and played a key role in providing technical advice and 
support in local government negotiations. Ideas emphasized in recent municipal guidance, 
including human agency, meaningful participation and community ownership of development 
planning (SALGA & GTZ 2006: 64, 70), echo the principles of grassroots organising prevalent 
in people’s power. 
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Governance 
The shaping of the new democratic state also introduced international experience to policy 
discussion on local government. Gaining popularity in development discourse internationally 
in the 1990s was the notion of ‘governance’. A response to the failure of state-heavy, top-down 
approaches to development, and widely encouraged by international financial institutions and 
donors, governance has been defined as ‘the entire set of relationships between the state, the 
market and society’ (Minogue 2002: 117). It is concerned not only with the state but with the 
relationship between state and citizen, incorporating the idea of citizens as important players 
in in the realisation of effective policies: ‘good governance’ itself requires ‘good citizenship’ 
(Cloete 1999: 12).  
The general features of governance discourse such as political accountability, legitimacy and 
human rights (Minogue 2002: 118-121) complemented simultaneous shifts in the ANC itself 
toward an embrace of liberal democratic principles and its values are assumed in policy 
documents on public participation in local governance (DPLG 2007; DPLG & LGSETA 
undated). This describes democratic governance as requiring ‘democratic participation through 
the voice of all civil society actors in policy and governance processes’ and emphasises the 
requirements of ‘open decision-making’ and ‘accountability’ (DPLG & LGSETA undated).6 
International governance standards have also informed strategies used in the application of the 
IDP –  a process through which residents can participate in the preparation, adoption, 
implementation and review of their municipality’s development vision (RSA 1998a; RSA 
2000). Based on the ‘core values’ of the International Association for Public Participation 
(Theron and Ceasar 2008: 112-13), this includes the principle that ‘the public should have a 
say in decisions about actions that could affect their lives’ (ibid.: 117).  
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It has been argued, however, that the ‘say’ given to beneficiaries in such governance processes 
correlates more to ‘informing’ or ‘consulting’ than to ‘collaboration’ or ‘empowerment’ (ibid.). 
Research on the IDP by Buccus (c.2005) suggests that, despite positive perceptions amongst 
policy makers about the value of participation, the planning process still only involved 
community input after major policy decisions had been taken. In this case it serves more to 
legitimate existing government plans (Everatt et al 2010: 237-8) than to incorporate community 
input. The ward committee, not dissimilarly, provides a mode of communication between 
council and community rather than any real mechanism for influence: councils are under no 
obligation to act on their recommendations.  
Performance management 
The usurping of participatory democracy’s empowering features is also attributable to shifts in 
South Africa’s macro-economic approach. In 1996, the RDP was effectively replaced as a 
socio-economic policy framework by the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme 
(GEAR). Focused on a market-oriented, growth-led model of development, GEAR has been 
interpreted by the Left as not only removing macro-economic policy from the sphere of 
democratic contestation, but as marking a break with participatory traditions. The closure of 
the central government RDP office correspondingly relocated the vision of development 
planning to the local terrain of governance (Harrison 2001: 186).  
Although this side-lining of the RDP arguably enabled a veneer of participation to remain while 
severely limiting popular control over the national agenda, local government policy has 
continued to draw on the need for communities to drive development. The participatory 
endeavours of municipalities, however, have also been accompanied by a technocratic and 
managerial approach to public sector organisation. Driven by principles of improved efficiency 
and tight fiscal control, this trend has constricted popular influence on municipal development 
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planning. The discourse of ‘new public management’, associated with the approach of good 
governance, is concerned not only with state-society relations but with improving the 
‘performance’ of the public sector (ibid.: 178-9). Through cost-recovery, outsourcing and a 
rolling-back of the state, local government has been encouraged to operate in a more business-
like fashion in which citizens become customers not partners.  
As such, although shifts toward participatory development have been spurred partly by the 
failure of top-down approaches (McGee 2002: 95), the costs of bottom-up development to 
efficiency and delivery are also inevitably weighed up (Pieterse 2002: 12; see also Heller 2001: 
146). Decentralisation trends in South Africa, as elsewhere in the world, have also not 
necessarily meant that control of policy design is relinquished by the centre (Harrison 2006: 
190). 
South Africa’s IDP embodies just this conundrum, trying to ensure fiscal responsibility, 
efficiency and effectivity as well as providing space for citizens to influence development 
priorities.7 The failure of the IDP accordingly results from what Heller describes as its 
‘prescriptive and state-led’ character (2001: 146) in which the development efforts of local 
government are hamstrung by a lack of local budgetary autonomy (ibid.: 147) and what Everatt 
(et al) describe as the state’s ‘death–grip on decision-making and budget allocation’ (2010: 
225). Mechanisms for citizens to influence planning in South Africa are thus circumscribed 
even at the most local level, closing off from popular democratic debate any real control over 
policy and expenditure. In this regard, Smith interestingly points to conceptual weaknesses in 
the original Local Government White Paper, contending that it ‘under-theorised’ the notion of 
participatory governance, giving little elaboration to aspects such as empowerment and 
participation (2007: 8). As such, citizen participation has been ‘confined to a narrowly 
prescribed set of structures and processes, to the exclusion of a more open and inclusionary 
practice’ (ibid.: 3). 
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PARTICIPATION IN MASS MOVEMENT DISCOURSE 
It was stated in the introduction to this paper that the ANC’s conception of democracy is 
interwoven with its mass movement history. The theory and practice of the participatory 
democratic project must therefore take into account the ruling party’s own influence, not only 
in the formal channels of policy development but in its role as a mass movement.  
Hegemony and the movement tradition 
Into the post-1994 period the ANC has continued to reiterate its role as not only a political 
party but also a mass movement. Its 1997 document on the ‘Character of the ANC’, linked this 
movement identity to three historic factors: its desire to be ‘a movement of mass participation’; 
its tradition as a ‘broad church’ and ‘hegemonic’ organisation; and the ‘style’ in which it has 
functioned, ‘[attempting] to be a force for cohesion in the centre of a broad range of allied 
organisations, mass democratic and community based structures’ (ANC 1997a). It is this 
movement tradition that the ANC sees as having informed the institutions of democratic 
governance that facilitate citizen participation:  
This movement tradition, which can be referred to as the masses in movement, is continued in our 
present commitment to a people-driven RDP. It is found in our attempts to develop, in the new 
conditions of our country, many new forms of popular activism and governance (ranging from 
community policing forums, to participatory local government budgeting, to work-place forums) 
[emphasis added] (ibid.). 
The longstanding belief in the ANC that democracy cannot be limited to features of procedural 
and electoral democracy alone, emerges from this tradition in which the people are not passive 
bystanders but active participants – the ‘masses in movement’. Wary that the people do not 
become mere ‘spectators’ of governance (ANC 2012: 3, 44), the ANC in the present has 
retained a keen movement discourse promoting the principle of popular participation. Its ability 
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to claim such a ‘movement tradition’ owes itself to the existence of a mass support base, 
comprised historically of organisations politically aligned with the liberation movement but 
unable under the conditions of the time to legally constitute membership. The very status of 
mass movement was contingent upon the ANC’s hegemony over what essentially constituted 
a broader ‘camp’ or, in the terminology of the 1980s, the ‘Mass Democratic Movement’ 
(MDM). These structures and organisations, in turn, recognised the ANC’s status as the 
‘vanguard’ of the struggle – a term to which I return later. 
It is evident from the preceding discussion that those sections of the ANC camp from which 
the participatory tradition derived were located primarily (though not exclusively) in the 
domestic movement – in the UDF, the civic organisations and the independent trade unions. 
The traditions and impetus of 1980s mobilisation were certainly part and parcel of the ANC 
camp. The ANC underground integrated into popular structures and domestic activists and 
organisations soaked up the liberation movement’s narrative. Many individuals within the 
MDM considered themselves as much a part of the ‘ANC’ as those in exile (Mufamadi 2012 
int.; Moosa 2013 int.). It was amongst the contingent at home, however, that ‘people’s power’ 
was born.  
After 1990 as the ANC began to reconstitute itself from an exiled struggle movement to a 
dominant governing movement, its relationship with popular structures became far less clear. 
The MDM represented both a part of the new ‘civil society’ and of the ANC historically. The 
ANC’s Commission on Organisation Building in 1991 acknowledged the strain on its relations 
with the civic movement in particular. While emphasizing that its own unbanning did not make 
the civics ‘redundant’, it continued to characterise their role as one of allegiance. Despite 
emphasising that civics should help to unite people ‘across the political spectrum’, it also stated 
that ‘[We] need to provide discussion around the role of ANC members in civic structures in 
order to see that the civics are part of the broader democratic movement - otherwise they can 
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and will be used by other forces against the interests of the people’ (ANC 1991: 5). What the 
ANC appears to have sought was an independent civil society that remained committed to the 
‘interests of the people’.  
Some in the ANC went further, arguing that civics could effectively be collapsed into the ANC 
and their interests represented by the overarching movement (Nzimande & Sikhosana 1992: 
26; Mayekiso 1993: 27). Indeed, the creation of the South African National Civic Organisation 
(SANCO) as an essentially co-opted structure of the ANC has left it with little autonomous 
influence. The presence of a strong Marxist-Leninist influence, originating with many ANC 
cadres’ dual membership of the South African Communist Party (SACP), was also exemplified 
amongst those who viewed the idea of ‘civil society’ as an institution of bourgeois rule 
(Nzimande and Sikhosana 1992: 27). Even Mandela chastised civil society structures in 1997 
for assuming the role of a ‘“watchdog” over our movement’ (Mandela 1997). 
Renewal of the vanguard 
Since 1990, the implications of this altered terrain alongside the ANC’s continued claim to 
mass movement status, can be seen in its co-option of key sections of the MDM. In more recent 
years, it has manifested in the gradual unravelling of the ANC camp itself with the breakaway 
of individuals, groups and organisations historically loyal to the movement. The splinter 
formation of the Congress of the People (COPE), the fracturing of COSATU, and the challenge 
posed by the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) provide but a few examples.8 Yet it also 
manifests in the playing out of participatory democracy. Expectations and demands for popular 
control now come increasingly from without: from the arena of civil society and opposition 
rather than the ranks of the movement itself. With this shift, the discourse of participatory 
democracy has separated out into more distinct currents. On the one hand, it is framed as a 
function of civil society – demonstrated in the rise of social movements and the organised 
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lobbying of government. On the other, it is located in invited spaces: in the institutionalised 
and legislated mechanisms provided by the state. Accompanying this, however, is a discourse 
of the ANC itself which associates participatory democracy with a reclamation of its own 
hegemony. In other words, a linking of popular participation with its history as a vanguard of 
the people.   
It is not insignificant that as a movement of mass struggle, the ANC has historically understood 
its role as being that of a ‘vanguard’ (Nzo 1991) – an organisation able to provide the required 
leadership and sustain mass political consciousness toward identified revolutionary ends. As a 
governing mass movement, the ANC has sought to retain this identity, making reference to 
itself directly as ‘a vanguard movement’ (ANC 2012: 12); ‘the vanguard of the NDR’ (meaning 
the National Democratic Revolution) (ANC 1997b); and ‘a vanguard movement for 
transformation’ (ANC 2012: 7). The notion of NDR in the ANC camp historically is that it 
would constitute the achievement of national liberation with the feature of a mixed economy - 
considered by both the ANC and its SACP ally as a necessary prelude to a transition to 
socialism. In the post-1994 era the NDR carries little conceptual relevance and has rather been 
retained by the ANC as a veneer of revolutionary language in a predominantly neo-liberal era. 
Yet no matter how irrelevant it may be to policy content in reality, both the NDR and 
vanguardism continue to be utilised by the movement to renew its historic claims.9 The 
relevance of this for participatory democracy lies in the relationship with the people it implies.  
In its reflection on the movement-mass relationship, the ANC has resurrected in recent years a 
language of ‘people’s power’. A discussion document on ‘organisational renewal’, presented 
at the ANC’s most recent national policy conference in 2012, included a section on 
‘participatory democracy’ which it described as ‘organising and mobilising our people for 
active participation in local transformation and development initiatives, including the creation 
of organs of people’s power’ [emphasis added] (ANC 2012: 55). As noted earlier, people’s 
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power in the 1980s was associated by many of its protagonists with empowerment and self-
organisation and was credited with providing inspiration for the building of a participatory 
democratic culture. Indeed, its contemporary usage in ANC lexicon is perhaps a not 
unconscious reminder of the ANC’s leadership role in the gains of popular struggle. Yet 
alongside the empowering current of people’s power, its structures were marred by democratic 
deficit. They were, in general, aligned to the ANC, and accounts of the period have highlighted 
their sometimes coercive nature and political intolerance of other organisations (Mufson 1990: 
129-30).  
It is not clear in the present what the ANC envisages for a resurrected ‘people’s power’, 
particularly as a form of participatory democracy. However, it has made similar proposals 
elsewhere for the resurrection of such structures. A resolution of the ANC’s 2007 policy 
conference included a call by President Jacob Zuma to re-establish ‘street committees’ as a 
way for communities to support local police in the fight against crime (ANC 2013: 36; Mthetwa 
2008). As organs of people’s power in the 1980s, ‘street committees’ were formed at the most 
local level and brought material and psychological benefits to communities, including a 
reduction in crime. Their resurrection in the present-day understandably draws on some of 
these successes.10  
ANC government minister and general secretary of the SACP, Blade Nzimande in an article in 
2008, suggested that the re-established street committees should not be party political, but 
should ‘seek to organise our people irrespective of political affiliations’ (2008). Yet he also 
made clear their link to the ANC’s identity, commenting that ‘By taking a lead in re-building 
such structures, the ANC will be affirming its “dual”, but necessary, roles as both a ruling party 
and a mass mobilizer of the people’ (ibid.). It is not incidental that Nzimande was among those 
in the early 1990s who saw the civics’ role as effectively nullified by the ANC’s return 
(Nzimande & Sikhosana 1992: 26). In the same 2008 article he goes on to assert that ‘there is 
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no inherent contradiction between governing and mobilising the people at the same time’, and 
I would agree that there is not. Yet this duality becomes problematic when mechanisms of 
governance stand in tension with structures of the movement; when street committees 
constitute ‘the revolutionary nucleus’ of CPFs (Nzimande 2008). While they may not be 
conceptualised as structures of the ANC, they are still envisaged as ‘a new platform to intensify 
the struggle for the renewal of the revolutionary values of our movement’ (ibid.). 
Of particular note is the ANC’s lasting reference to the ‘MDM’ – now used as an ambiguous, 
catch-all phrase in ANC parlance for ‘progressive’ civil society (ANC 2013). In an interview 
with the author of this article in 2013, Yunus Carrim (then Deputy Minister of Cooperative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs - CoGTA) highlighted the importance to local government 
of a strong civil society, remarking: ‘even if you actually have popular power at local 
government level via the state structures, you also have to have a strong civil society movement 
as well ... If you have a strong civil society it empowers the municipality and if you have a 
strong municipality, it should I believe empower civil society too’ (2013 telephone int.). 
However, he went on to define civil society as those who fall within the MDM: 
Of course, the term civil society is being increasingly contested in our movement … because of the 
nature of some of the organisations, individuals and other actors that occupy this space in recent years, 
and the crude juxtaposition of some of them that civil society is all good and the state is all bad … 
[I]ncreasingly some of us speak of progressive civil society as important. Or we might, in a more limited 
way, speak of the mass democratic movement when we speak of progressive actors that engage in civil 
society [emphasis added] (ibid.). 
Accordingly, local government can only be strengthened by those within civil society who are 
identified by the ANC as ‘progressive’. While reiterating the active role of the people in the 
process of development, the ANC also stated that “communities can shape the kind of 
development they want if led by an agent for change’ [emphasis added] (2012: 44). As the 
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ANC understands itself to be that ‘agent for change’ (ibid.: 7, 23, 29), then ‘the participation 
of communities in shaping development’ would seem to be ‘bound by their allegiance to the 
movement’ (Brooks Yung 2014: 147). The subsequent remark that ‘[communities] can also be 
misled by other forces contesting the space to turn against the ANC’ (2012: 44) infers the 
illegitimacy of those views channelled through other organisations and structures. 
While perceiving itself as having allowed the structures of the broader movement to maintain 
‘ideological and organisational independence’, the ANC still asserts that it has sought to ‘fuse 
or combine their energies, constituencies and diverse capacities into a common national 
democratic purpose’ (1997a). The movement’s discourse of participation, in contrast to 
published policy, does not promote the cultivation of an empowered and informed citizenry 
but rather the renewal of the role of vanguard and maintenance of an active but loyal people.  
CONCEPTUAL TENSIONS AND PARALLELS 
Examination of the theoretical currents shaping participatory democracy has sought to bring to 
the fore the critical role of ideas, showing that the conceptual composition of participation as 
it has emerged in South Africa, has generated conceptual weaknesses that have yielded failure 
in practice.    
Restricted participation through policy and movement 
Although these various influences have led to conceptual tensions, failure can in part be 
explained by some mutually reinforcing imperatives. Despite starkly different ideological 
origins, both the discourse of public management and of the mass movement have contributed 
to a narrowing of the field of popular influence. One of the most contentious points in policy 
evolution is the ANC’s shift toward economic liberalism. While preserving a discourse of 
NDR, its ideological contender is the elephant in the room. The eclipsing of the RDP with the 
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programme of GEAR rests on the neo-liberal assumption that market growth will facilitate 
development. At the same time, the RDP’s principles and values of people-driven development 
remain apparent in legislation. While perhaps toned down from the more radical mechanisms 
envisaged by some on the Left, municipal guidance does nonetheless advance the importance 
of cultivating informed citizens who are empowered to shape development. The realisation of 
this objective, however, is undercut from both sides.  
The strand of good governance promoting new public management prioritises the need for 
efficiency and delivery over bottom-up control. This performance-driven, technocratic 
approach has been key in narrowing the agenda for participation and circumscribing the degree 
of popular influence. As such, South Africans have forums for participation but on a limited 
range of issues, carefully controlled by budgetary prescriptions and public sector performance 
priorities. In parallel, this restricted understanding of participation, ‘stripped of the political 
volatility of direct popular involvement’ (De Beer 1996: 67), has for the ANC sustained its 
vanguard tradition by enabling a top-down mode of development to continue. A void and 
ambiguous promise of NDR simultaneously enables the governing movement to mask where 
power really lies.11  
It is with some irony that in the participatory project the ANC draws not on its own people-
driven RDP, which originally informed public policy, but on the vacuous notion of NDR and 
the historic ‘movement tradition’. Worlds apart from its formal commitments to a neo-liberal 
framework, the ANC’s failure to critically review the NDR’s applicability has confined it 
largely to political rhetoric. Yet it is possible to see that the centralisation of control and 
‘technocratic creep’ as described by Heller (2001: 146) and have enabled the ANC to 
simultaneously remove from popular contestation its own policy programme. Despite starkly 
different ideological origins - one seeking efficiency and cost-recovery and the other a 
hegemonic unity - the simultaneous usage of managerial and mass movement discourses have 
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been mutually reinforcing. What Heller describes as the emergence of a ‘bureaucratic and 
commandist logic’ of local government is both in fitting with the ANC’s vanguard legacy, but 
has also been enabled by the extent of its hegemony (ibid.: 134).  
Participation as teleological 
From this ironic parallel is also an identifiable tension. In the ANC’s own framing of 
participation, it is notable that influences of democratic and development theory are far less 
discernible. The revolutionary rhetoric espoused in discussion documents, publications and 
speeches of the ANC does not draw on the empowering potential of participation found in 
public policy. The movement’s recent commentary even contrasts to that contained in its own 
RDP. Those aspects of policy advancing an understanding of democracy in which citizens 
‘exercise judgement [and] contribute to debate and discussion’ (DPLG & LGSETA undated, 
module 3, part B: 18), are undermined by a teleological discourse that links participation to the 
extension of ANC hegemony. 
The dissipation of the wider ANC camp has certainly had some bearing. Those voices pushing 
for a retention of participatory traditions are now increasingly to be found outside of the 
movement – a trend that has escalated notably in the 2000s as those with a history of civic and 
trade union activism have passed through government or left party politics altogether. It is also 
attributable to what the ANC itself acknowledges as the space of mass mobilisation being left 
open to alternative forces (ANC 2012:18). The rise of so-called ‘service delivery’ protests 
points to a diminishing of its vanguard claims. Yet it is also, I argue, attributable to the 
movement’s dominant discourse of democracy.  
As noted earlier, the ANC has always constituted a ‘broad church’, encompassing a range of 
organisations and structures as part of its wider camp. Yet with dominant ideological traditions 
in both African Nationalism and Marxism-Leninism, it also in many respects bears 
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resemblance to a vanguard-style party.12 The popular mobilisation this role demands 
constitutes an important and legitimate activity. The revolutionary theory by which the ANC 
in exile was guided required the active participation of the masses. It is problematic, however, 
when such mobilisation is conflated with the process of governance – when public policy is 
paired with an understanding of citizen participation as an intra-movement activity.  
Not long after the publication of the Municipal Systems Act (2000), a 2001 article in ANC 
journal Umrabulo by Yunus Carrim, who at the time Chaired the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee on Local Government, made a direct correlation between the structures of local 
government and advancement of revolutionary objectives. Carrim recommended that “the 
national framework [on the local government system] be given more political detail and be 
linked closely to our national democratic tasks”. He added, ‘We are not just seeking to effect a 
new system of local government. We are also seeking to use this new system to significantly 
advance the national democratic transition’ [emphasis added] (2001). He gave political 
inflection, in particular, to ward committees, noting that ‘Ideally, the ward committee should 
be used to mobilise the broadest range of interests in the community behind progressive goals 
as part of the overall national democratic transition’ (ibid.). Later, at its 2007 policy conference, 
the ANC branch was also linked to the ward committee. Amongst branch responsibilities, the 
ANC listed ‘to give leadership to the developmental agenda of each community by 
spearheading community participation in the IDP process and strengthening the ward 
committee’ (ANC 2007: 13). 
 The paucity of any substantive content in the application of the term ‘national democracy’ 
does not prevent its use as a euphemism for the maintenance of hegemony, nor or as an historic 
justification of the ANC’s right to govern. The consequence of encouraging the use of ward 
committees for advancement of ‘national democracy’ is the undermining of simultaneous 
efforts to reduce party political control of ward committees. As Deputy Minister of CoGTA in 
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2013, Carrim himself stated: ‘We are considering reviewing the legislation to explore the 
possibility of reducing the prospects of … party-political activists dominating the ward 
committee’ (2013 telephone int.). The DPLG’s ward committee resource book also emphasised 
the risks to democracy of party influence on ward committee nomination processes, warning 
that it ‘brings a high degree of party influence into what, in policy terms, is intended to be a 
civil society function’ (DPLG & GTZ 2005: 31). The suggestion that they be utilised to 
mobilise communities behind progressive (read ‘ANC’) goals thus undermines their role set 
out by the DPLG as ‘a function of civic society’ which should operate ‘independently of the 
structures imposed by party alliances’ (ibid.: 34). 
As suggested earlier, democratic deficit in the ANC’s understanding of participation is linked 
to traditions in its own camp historically. The structures of people’s power met democratic 
criteria in so far as they incorporated community members, elected their representatives, and 
involved active participation. However, they were not multi-interest forums or politically 
pluralistic structures. Mechanisms of participatory governance, in contrast, must be 
characterised not only by the involvement of citizens in decision-making, but by the openness 
and uncertainty of outcome that we expect of democracy generally. They cannot act as vehicles 
for predetermined political ends.  
The ANC’s recent resurrection of street committees flags this very problem. Under apartheid, 
organs of people’s power filled a crucial gap: their activists and proponents developed 
alternative ways of organising society in the face of state neglect and an absence of political 
and civil rights. Today, South Africans live in a formal democratic state, in which people’s 
rights have constitutional protection and they are able to vote for the structures of government. 
Mechanisms and programmes designed to advance development and foster the realisation of 
such rights must therefore operate within the bounds of accountable institutions. What the street 
committee initiative leaves unclear is how it will relate to such institutions. The most obvious 
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example in this regard is the relationship with CPFs, structures established under the South 
African Police Service Act of 1995 to improve community-police relations and to mobilise 
communities to assist in crime prevention.  
The role of the street committee in 2008 was set out by the ANC’s Nathi Mthetwa as being 
supplementary ‘to the work of the other civil society and governance organs and institutions’ 
(Mthetwa 2008).13 While not officially structures of the party, however, the implication is that 
they be imbued with ideological purpose – addressing the potential for vigilantism through 
‘ideological training’ to prevent them being exploited by ‘counter-revolutionaries’ (ibid.). 
Rather than address existing weaknesses in the community policing system, such as the lack of 
community representivity, the solution proposed is that street committees play a leading role 
instead (Nzimande 2008). Yet there is no guarantee that they, too, will not become dominated 
by the same voices. If subject to ideological direction, we can only assume that they will be 
structures aligned to the ANC. 
Caution about their resurrection is not to dismiss the potential of street committees in either 
crime prevention or community development. However, the solution to challenges of 
participatory governance should not be the introduction of seemingly partisan structures which 
fall outside of legislation. There is nothing to stop the ANC from introducing street committees 
as party political structures, perhaps intended to link residents at street-level with the local 
ANC branch. However, the problem arises when they are created under the pretence of political 
neutrality, or at the expense of improvements to existing mechanisms for participatory 
governance. 
Attempts to increase party influence over multi-interest structures might justifiably be 
interpreted as a response to declining hegemony. The revival of struggle-era terminology and 
the notion of ‘people’s power’ has certainly overlapped with both a rise in social protest and 
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the surfacing of internal threats to the ANC’s political stability. Yet currents of hegemony and 
vanguardism in the movement’s participatory discourse represent consistencies rather than 
deviations. Popular protest has drawn attention to a weakening of its mass movement status, 
and the idea of extending its hegemony across both civil society and structures of governance 
may well be the chosen solution. The ANC’s teleological view of participatory democracy, 
however, represents not a post-1994 shift, nor a reneging on its policy commitments, but lies 
at the core of the ANC’s conception of popular participation itself.  
The conflation of structures of democracy with those of the mass movement can be located in 
the organisational history of the ANC camp, in which its own claim to the status of mass 
movement derived from the very structures and organisations now a part of civil society. The 
tension between the ANC’s role as mass governing movement and its history as a mass struggle 
movement is played out in intertwining of participatory democracy with the extension of its 
own hegemony.  
CONCLUSION 
This paper has examined the ANC’s understanding of participatory democracy in order to show 
how weaknesses in practice might be explained by the underlying theory. A number of 
theoretical disciplines and intellectual traditions have fed into the formulation of policy. 
Participatory traditions in the ANC camp itself, and the experience of ‘people’s power’ in 
particular, gave impetus and shape to the establishment after 1994 of popular forums to involve 
ordinary people in municipal-level planning. These traditions, in turn, spoke to trends in 
development discourse internationally which gave increasing emphasis to the active 
participation and agency of beneficiaries in the development process itself. 1990s policy 
mainstreaming of the idea of ‘good governance’ also stressed the importance of the relationship 
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between citizen and state and, in South Africa, became influential on the model of local 
government. 
At the same time, this assorted heritage has created a tension in policy objectives. The model 
of new public management associated with governance discourse has had the effect of curbing 
popular influence by prioritising fiscal constraints and efficiency over democracy and 
empowerment. The ideas contained in policy make-up – and conflicting imperatives of the 
macro-economic framework – can thus help to account for impediments in practice. Yet neo-
liberalism has not been alone in facilitating a narrow form of participation. This paper has also 
sought to argue that the ANC’s conception of democracy is entwined with its mass movement 
heritage – a status earned by virtue of its mass support base and establishment of hegemony 
over a range of popular organisations and structures. As a mass movement, with a range of 
constituent parts, the radical democratic heritage of contemporary policy can be found within 
the ANC’s ranks. Yet these participatory traditions before 1994 were an intra-movement and 
self-sustaining activity. Participants were united by a common goal – working with the 
movement not against it – and it is to this organisational history that the ANC’s discourse of 
participation is tied.  
In the post-1994 context, the sections of its broader camp are a part of civil society and are 
amongst the very citizens for whom participatory governance forums are intended. A discourse 
of democracy in which participation is seen teleologically – as a means of extending ANC 
hegemony – thus undermines the very function of these mechanisms as multi-interest structures 
for the influence of citizens. The conceptual intertwining of mass movement and democracy, 
and mutual reinforcement of the ascendance of technocracy, have contributed in South Africa 
to the failure of participatory democracy to realise its objectives in practice. The shielding of 
the policy agenda from the arena of popular influence, and conflation of the ANC’s programme 
with the democratic will of citizens, does not aspire to the degree of popular agency required 
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in public policy. Indeed, a reassertion of the role of vanguard takes us further away, not closer, 
to real citizen control. 
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NOTES 
1. The notion of ‘invented’ spaces was coined by Miraftab (2004) to refer to grassroots spaces of collective 
action which push for change, as supposed to institutionalised spaces, described by Cornwall (2002), in which 
citizens are ‘invited’ to participate. 
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2. #Feesmustfall was a campaign initiated in October 2015 by students at South Africa’s public universities 
demanding a zero per cent increase in tuition fees. The campaign has since spread through university campuses 
across the country, extending to both solidarity with workers for an end to university outsourcing, as well as to 
ongoing demands for free higher education.  
3. See articles by these authors on weaknesses in the ward committee system generally, as well as in particular 
locales. The report produced by Kabane (undated) for Afesis-Corplan looks to have been published c.2012. 
4. Everatt et al (2010) refer to surveys commissioned in 2006 and 2007 by the Department for Social 
Development.  
5. Yunus Carrim was a UDF activist and, between 2009 and 2013, was Deputy Minister of Co-operative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs. Lechesa Tsenoli was a UDF and civic activist, a former President of the 
South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) and Deputy Minister of Rural Development and Land 
Reform from 2011 and 2013. Paul Mashatile, a former Gauteng MEC and, between 2010 and 2014, the Minister 
of Arts and Culture, has a background in the UDF and in youth organisation in Alexandra.    
6. The workbook constitutes certified course material produced by the DPLG and LGSETA and is therefore 
undated. The acknowledgements listed in the document, however, suggest that it was published after 2007. 
7. Pieterse, for example, describes the IDP as combining ‘democratic governance, participatory planning and 
efficient, modern managerial practice’ (2002: 5). 
8. In the run up to the 2009 national elections, a breakaway of individuals supportive of former ANC President 
Thabo Mbeki assembled to form COPE as a political party to challenge the ANC. In 2013, the EFF formed as a 
far Left alternative to the ANC following the expelling of Julius Malema as President of the ANC Youth League. 
The EFF, headed by Malema, is currently the third largest party in the national parliament. 
9. For a discussion of the ANC’s use of nostalgia and historic claims to renew itself in the present, see Brooks 
Yung (2014). 
10. On the role and functions of some recently established street committees, see IRIN (24.9.2008); Mail and 
Guardian (08.11.2013); and Marks & Wood (2010). 
11. Thanks are due to Shireen Hassim for her assistance in this formulation.  
12. For a broader discussion of the nature of the ANC as a mass party, with roots in both Marxist-Leninist and 
united front traditions, see Brooks Yung (2014). 
13. Mthetwa subsequently became Minister of Safety and Security. 
